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A B S T R A C T
Oﬀshore wind power development is expected to play an important role in meeting the EU climate targets. To
integrate oﬀshore wind power, advanced oﬀshore infrastructures such as meshed grids are suggested to optimise
the grid development. Meshed oﬀshore grids refer to integrated oﬀshore infrastructure where oﬀshore wind
power hubs are interconnected to several countries as opposed to radial connection linking the wind farm to one
single country and market. However, development of meshed architectures is hindered by the legal and reg-
ulatory barriers.
Earlier research has identiﬁed the lack of cooperation and misalignments in national legal and regulatory
frameworks as being the main risk factors in integrated oﬀshore network investments. The purpose of this article
is to investigate whether a supra-national TSO could facilitate regional cooperation and coordinated investments
to develop meshed oﬀshore grids.
Several studies have discussed the case of North Seas, but the Baltic Sea region has had less attention despite
the large oﬀshore wind development potential. In this paper, a multi-disciplinary approach combining legal
dogmatics and regulatory economics is used to identify the existing barriers and the possible solutions. The Baltic
Sea countries are used as illustration. We suggest legal and regulatory recommendations that comply with the EU
energy policy targets of sustainability, competition and reliability.
1. Introduction
In November 2016, the Paris Agreement came into force committing
the parties of the Treaty to hold the increase in the global average
temperature to well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels (Art. 2). Both
the European Union (EU) and its Member States have ratiﬁed the
Treaty. To contribute to the global climate change mitigation and to
enable shift to a low-carbon economy, the EU has set its internal climate
targets for the years 2020, 2030 and 2050 (COM, 2010 0639; COM,
2010/0639; COM, 2014 15; COM, 2011 885). Updates to 2030 targets
are made in the context of Clean Energy Package1 (European
Commission, 2018), and with regard to 2050, the European Commis-
sion strives now for more ambitious targets (COM, 2018 773).
The commitments to address climate change and the ongoing en-
ergy transition have urged new perspectives to be adopted in energy
law research (Heﬀron and Talus, 2016a). While guaranteeing of se-
curity of supply and establishing of competitive markets have been key
objectives in energy law already for decades, the sustainability as a part
of a larger concept of energy justice has relatively recently begun togain
more attention in energy law research (Heﬀron and Talus, 2016b). As
the premises for legal frameworks (energy systems themselves) are
changing due to the ongoing energy transition, the core questions of
energy law research are changing, too.
During the past few years, there has been growing interest towards
theoretical aspects of energy law to deﬁne this reshaping ﬁeld and its
legal principles (Heﬀron et al., 2018). Speciﬁcally, the concepts of en-
ergy justice and just transition in law – like in other disciplines – has
received substantial attention (Heﬀron and McCauley, 2017; Heﬀron
and Talus, 2016b). In the Clean Energy Package, ‘just transition’ seems
to already become part of the binding law, where it refers to transition
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2019.01.047
Received 30 April 2018; Received in revised form 15 January 2019; Accepted 18 January 2019
⁎ Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: kanerva.sunila@aalto.ﬁ (K. Sunila), clberg@dtu.dk (C. Bergaentzlé), benedicte.martin@ikem.de (B. Martin), ari.ekroos@aalto.ﬁ (A. Ekroos).
1 Clean Energy Package refers to the package of legislative proposals the European Commission gave in November 2016. At the time of writing, all the legislative
acts have not been ﬁnalised.
Energy Policy 128 (2019) 775–782
0301-4215/ © 2019 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/BY/4.0/).
T
away from fossil-fuel generation towards clean energy system.2
Oﬀshore wind power (OW) is considered as one of the key enablers
of the transition to clean energy system (IEA, 2016). It has been argued
that OW integration could be facilitated by integrated infrastructures
such as meshed oﬀshore grids (MOG) (Konstantelos et al., 2017; Cole
et al., 2015; De Decker and Kreutzkamp, 2011; Gorenstein Dedecca
et al., 2017). A MOG refers to an integrated oﬀshore infrastructure by
which OW hubs are interconnected to several countries as opposed to
radial connections which link the wind farm traditionally to one single
country and market (European Commission, 2016a). MOG consist
consequently in hybrid infrastructure, characterised by its dual-purpose
(wind power integration and interconnection) and multi-lateral (more
than two stakeholders and countries involved) dimensions. This article
studies the current legal and regulatory barriers for MOGs as a way to
optimise investment in oﬀshore network infrastructure and speed-up
OW integration and interconnections across countries.
The article investigates whether introducing of a new kind of
transmission system operator (TSO), namely a “supra-national oﬀshore
TSO”, would be a solution to overcome the identiﬁed barriers to MOG
development. A multidisciplinary approach combining legal dogmatics
and regulatory economics analysis is used to explore the barriers for
developing MOG, focusing especially on the ﬁnancing and cost recovery
of the oﬀshore network, and for analysing the potential of the new
supra-national oﬀshore TSO. In contrast to most of the earlier research,
the article illustrates national regulatory barriers with the Baltic Sea
countries.
The article is structured as follows. Section 2 gives background to
the research. Section 3 assesses the relevant legal framework by dis-
cussing the questions related to the applicable jurisdiction and the
challenges associated with the deﬁnitions of dual-purpose cables.
Section 4 identiﬁes the main barriers arising from the application of
multiple regulatory frameworks for grid investments using the BSR
countries as a test case. In Section 5, a supra-national oﬀshore TSO is
deﬁned and reviewed as a potential solution to overcome the current
legal and regulatory barriers. Section 6 concludes.
2. Meshed oﬀshore grids to reach decarbonised integrated
markets
In Europe, 25 GW of cumulated oﬀshore wind power (OW) capacity
is expected to be connected to European grids by 2020 (Schwabe et al.,
2011) compared to the installed capacity of 15.8 GW in 2017
(WindEurope, 2017). This trend is anticipated to grow, supported by
technology improvements in HVDC lines and dramatic cost reductions
in wind turbine manufacturing (Danish Energy Agency, 2017), which
both create opportunities for oﬀshore wind energy to develop farther
away from shores. However, OW integration is challenged by the dif-
ﬁculties arising from the grid planning and the large investment needed
to build the infrastructure and the sharing of this burden among mul-
tiple stakeholders.
Hybrid oﬀshore infrastructure projects have recently received
growing attention. In 2010, ten North Seas countries signed a
Memorandum of Understanding launching a North Seas Grid Initiative
that aims at becoming one of the building blocks of future European
super grid. Also in the North Sea, the Danish and Dutch TSOs, plan to
build a power island connecting 30 GW of wind energy for an estimated
cost of EUR 15 billion (Energinet.dk, 2017a). In the Baltic Sea, the
Kriegers Flak Combined Grid Solution linking Denmark, Germany, and
initially Sweden, is actually the ﬁrst project combining OW connection
to cross-border lines to be developed (Energinet.dk, 2017b). Lately, PSE
S.A, the Polish TSO, announced a hybrid solution will be considered if
OW capacity development is higher than the 4 GW currently planned in
the Polish network development plan (Wieczerzak-Krusińska, 2018).
The main economic argument for MOG development is to increase
the value of both the interconnector and the oﬀshore wind farms (OWF)
by taking advantage of synergy eﬀects, provided that a critical mass of
OWF is planned to be connected (De Decker and Kreutzkamp, 2011).
Integrated architectures can also signiﬁcantly reduce the cost to up-
grade onshore networks and help to reach a better utilisation factor of
the oﬀshore grid. In the Kriegers Flak Combined Grid Solution project,
the feasibility assessment showed an increase in the use of the cable
from 36% up to 79% (50Hertz et al., 2010). Positive externalities as-
sociated with the increase of interconnection capacities are also ex-
pected in terms of CO2 emissions reductions, faster energy transition,
stronger price convergences across markets, and increase of welfare
across connected countries attributable to the expansion of inter-
connections.
However, the development of hybrid infrastructure is challenged by
the limited degree of coordination in the planning and funding of net-
work infrastructure and opens new questions on grid operation, as
pinpointed by the European Commission in the North Sea case
(European Commission, 2016a). Institutionally, the lack of mandatory
integrated oﬀshore grid planning and dedicated governance bodies
have important repercussions on future integrated oﬀshore projects
(Gorenstein Dedecca et al., 2017). In addition, the current electricity
market rules, both at EU and national level, are not planned to take into
account the speciﬁcities of hybrid grids. As there is currently a lack of
legal deﬁnition for MOG, applicable rules are not clear and even the
question of applicable jurisdiction rises (Roeben, 2013; Woolley, 2013;
Müller, 2015). Notably, the questions relating to how the MOG should
be developed and operated, whether the access to grid can be guaran-
teed for the connected OW (capacity allocation) (Nieuwenhout, 2018)
and how the costs should be allocated between diﬀerent grid users
(Tscherning, 2011) rise. Another explanatory reason lies in the diﬀerent
national legal and regulatory frameworks applied to electricity net-
works development and that result in fragmented investment signals
and uneven ﬁnancial risks (Jay and Toonen, 2015; Knudsen et al., 2015;
Fitch-Roy, 2016; Gorenstein Dedecca et al., 2017).
3. In search of jurisdiction and legal deﬁnitions
In the legal research, the question of the applicable jurisdiction is
usually the ﬁrst to address, because it determines which rules apply and
how a certain project is regulated. If the applicable rules are not clear,
the developer may have diﬃculties to assess the proﬁtability of the
project – especially when it comes to regulated activities like the
transmission system development and operation.
3.1. Question of applicable jurisdiction
The oﬀshore wind farms and part of the oﬀshore infrastructure in
the meshed grid conﬁguration may locate in the Exclusive Economic
Zone (EEZ) of a coastal country, which is an important factor when
considering the relevant jurisdiction. In the EEZ, the coastal state does
not have full sovereignty contrary to territorial waters, but the national
jurisdiction can be declared to partly apply. In accordance with the
international law of sea, namely United Nations Convention on the Law
of Sea (UNCLOS, 1982), the coastal states have sovereign right for
economic exploitation of the EEZ, including wind power production
and construction of the needed installations (like substations) (UNCLOS
Art. 56). However, the right of other states to lay cables in the EEZ is
also guaranteed by the UNCLOS if the cables do not relate to the eco-
nomic activity in the EEZ (UNCLOS, Art. 58; 79 and 87). Thus, inter-
connectors passing the EEZ can be laid down without consent of the
coastal state, with some limited exceptions, whereas the park-to-shore
cables may need this consent. Therefore, the national jurisdiction can
become diﬀerently applied to interconnectors not relating to the
2 “Just” also includes that economic and social aspects are taken into account
when implementing transition. The ﬁnal formulation of the recast Electricity
Market Regulation is not available at the time of writing.
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economic activity and park-to-shore cables relating to economic activ-
ities (Roggenkamp et al., 2010; Barnes, 2014).
In the light of earlier studies, it seems to be clear that EU law can be
applied in the EEZ as long as the Member State has jurisdiction
(Roeben, 2013; Talus and Wüstenberg, 2017). Even though the EU does
not have jurisdiction independently from its Member States, for ex-
ample, the directly applicable EU Regulations may become applicable
also in the EEZ. In the earlier studies it has been discussed whether the
EU or its Member States have powers at all to regulate oﬀshore inter-
connectors (not relating to economic activities) in the EEZ. However, in
practice, the national and EU law is currently applied to oﬀshore in-
terconnectors inside the EU internal market (Müller, 2015;
Nieuwenhout, 2018). When considering wind power generation in the
EEZ, the coastal state's and EU jurisdiction is even clearer. In addition to
the fact that all the coastal European states in the Baltic Sea are EU
Member States, this gives us groundings to take the EU law, which has
widely aﬀected the national legal regimes, as a starting point.3
3.2. A meshed oﬀshore grid in legal terms
Following the terminology of the Electricity Market Directive
(Directive 2009/72/EC) and Regulation (EC) No 714/2009, MOGs
consist potentially of cross-border ‘interconnectors’ pursuant to the
Electricity Market Regulation, and of park-to-shore cables which are
not separately deﬁned in the EU law. In addition, the cables may
function simultaneously in both purposes (cross-border interconnectors
and OWF connection cables). These dual-purpose cables are currently
unknown in the EU electricity market legislation (Müller, 2017;
Nieuwenhout, 2018). It can be noted that in the preamble of
Commission Regulation (EU) 2016/1447 establishing a network code
on requirements for grid connection of high voltage direct current
systems and direct current-connected power park modules, the concept
of meshed oﬀshore grid is recognised, however, the Regulation does not
establish a deﬁnition for the grid.
The classiﬁcation of the cables importantly aﬀects the applicable
rules. Regarding interconnectors, the requirements of unbundling, non-
discriminatory third-party access, ex ante approved terms of access to
interconnectors and capacity allocation mechanisms, and tariﬀs, as well
as the regulated use of the congestion incomes become applicable un-
less an exemption under the Electricity Market Regulation (EC) No 714/
2009, Art. 17, is granted. The unbundling requirement for inter-
connector operators practically means that a new interconnector (or a
transmission system) should be operated by an unbundled TSO, or two
TSOs, which blocks the solution that a wind power operator would
operate the oﬀshore grid. As in part of the Member States such as
Finland, Sweden and Poland, connection cables are the responsibility of
OWF, there would potentially be several responsible actors for oﬀshore
grid infrastructure in the meshed grid.
Despite the involvement of several stakeholders, the national TSOs
are the key actors in the MOG development, as they have the respon-
sibility to develop the transmission systems and interconnections to
other systems under the current legal frameworks (Directive 2009/72/
EC, Art. 12). Therefore, the legal regime directing the investments of
TSOs is studied in the following section.
4. From European legislation to national implementation
4.1. Overview of the legal framework for transmission and interconnection
investment in Europe
In the context of integrated MOG, grid planning and investment
activities are coordinated among various stakeholders through signals
that are formed in national regulatory frameworks. From an economic
perspective, the diverse national regulatory frameworks applying to
grid access tariﬀs, cross-border management and connection costs al-
location have the potential to jeopardise MOG development.
In the EU, the legal regime for transmission tariﬀs is currently laid
down in the Electricity Market Directive (2009/72/EC), and further
elaborated by the Electricity Market Regulation (EC) No 714/2009.
Accordingly, the transmission grid tariﬀs must be transparent, non-
discriminatory, cost-reﬂective (Directive 2009/72/EC, Art. 32), and
should not be distance-related (Regulation 714/2009, Art. 14).
Further rules, speciﬁc to interconnectors, are provided in the
Regulation (EC) No 714/2009 setting the harmonised principles for
capacity allocation across borders, congestion revenues, and the use of
these revenues. According to the Regulation, the congestion revenues
should be used for “guaranteeing the actual availability of the allocated
capacity and/or maintaining or increasing interconnection capacities
through network investments, in particular in new interconnectors”.
However, if the revenues cannot be eﬃciently used for these purposes,
the national regulatory authorities (NRAs) can decide that part of the
congestion rents is used to reduce national tariﬀs. The rest of the rev-
enues shall be placed on a separate account to wait for the possible use
(Regulation 714/2009, Art. 16(6)). Pursuant to the Regulation, there
should be no speciﬁc network charges for the access to cross-border
infrastructure inside the EU. Together, these prohibitions to apply a
separate tariﬀ in interconnectors and to use the congestion revenues to
other purposes than the ones set out in the Regulation cause a situation
where other actors than TSOs do not have incentives to develop oﬀ-
shore grids, unless a ‘merchant exemption’ pursuant to Regulation (Art.
17) is granted. Other costs resulting from cross-border ﬂows and losses
that are inherent to the trading of electricity across borders are covered
with the inter-TSO compensation (ITC) mechanism, as stipulated in
Regulation 714/2009, Art. 13, and the Commission Regulation (EU) No
838/2010.
Finally, the RES Directive (Directive 2009/28/EC) lays down the
rules regarding the transmission network investments and connection
cost allocation in the case of renewable power generation units.4 The
sharing of costs should also be based on objective, transparent and non-
discriminatory criteria. In accordance with the Directive, Member
States may require TSOs to bear the costs of technical adaptations in the
network fully or partly, but there is no requirement for any special
treatment of renewable power generation units compared to other units
(Art. 16(4)).
4.2. Identifying the barriers to coordinated investment in integrated oﬀshore
grids
The EU-level legal framework for transmission tariﬀs, congestion
management and connection cost allocation leaves the Member States,
or NRAs, with a certain degree of freedom in implementation (Vedder
et al., 2016). This has resulted in a diversity of rules and incentive in-
struments for network use and development that reﬂects the plurality of
3 It should be noted that in the context of Clean Energy Package, for example,
Electricity Market Directive (Directive 2009/72/EC), Electricity Market
Regulation (EC) No 714/2009 and Renewable Energy Directive (Directive
2009/28/EC) are revised. The new RES Directive has been published at the time
of writing whereas the ﬁnal wordings of the other two are not available. The
following discussion is based on the Third Energy Package, which forms the
basis for the current national legal frameworks.
4 New RES Directive (Directive (EU) 2018/2001) was enacted as part of the
Clean Energy Package, and the Directive 2009/28/EC will be repealed with
eﬀect from July 2021. The discussed rules are transferred to the Electricity
Market Directive and Regulation of which ﬁnal versions are not available at the
time of writing (recital 60). As the current national rules are based on the
Directive 2009/28/EC, it is used here as a basis for the discussion.
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energy policies and national interests (PwC et al., 2016; NSCOGI,
2012b; NSCOGI, 2014; Bhagwat et al., 2017). The prevalence of na-
tional interest may ultimately have distorting eﬀects when it comes to
investment decisions of both market and regulated actors. It may also
damage coordination in trans-national projects.
4.2.1. National grid access tariﬀs: a risk of market distortions
Currently, a patchwork of diﬀerent grid access tariﬀs exist in
Europe, reﬂecting often more political decisions than the real cost
distribution of utilities (Honkapuro and Tuunanen, 2012; Eurelectric,
2016), The coexistence of multiple grid access tariﬀs at the European
level has received attention when discussing about the completion of
the internal electricity market and the energy transition (CEPA, 2015).
In a context of MOG, this topic becomes critical since diﬀerent grid
access conditions apply to a same infrastructure.
In the Baltic Sea countries, grid access tariﬀs diﬀer quite sub-
stantially both in relation to whom they apply and in terms of their
design. Only Denmark, Sweden and Finland apply an access fee to
generators (ENTSO-E, 2017). The Danish tariﬀ is entirely based on a per
unit fee for the energy fed in the network. In Finland and Sweden, a
capacity component is in addition paid. In Sweden, this ﬁxed charge is
dominant and a locational signal is added to the tariﬀ to drive grid
connection to the less constrained lines.
The tariﬀ design aﬀects generators’ competitiveness on the market
(Vedder et al., 2016). While the energy-based tariﬀ adds a cost that is
proportional to the level of production, a capacity-based tariﬀ may be
detrimental to generators with low load factor when competing with
other power plants, notably producing in baseload. Because the tariﬀ
paid by OW operators is ultimately reﬂected in their bidding strategy,
the juxtaposition of diﬀerent tariﬀs in an MOG context raise a particular
interest because it aﬀects unevenly the business case of generators and
send contradictory signals. This is quite clear if an arbitrage must be
made between connecting to an infrastructure with grid access fee, or
free of charge. Besides, the co-existence of diﬀerent tariﬀ structures
increases investor's perceptions of risk (EWEA, 2016). This gives space
to consideration on where to connect – and locate – OWF, supposedly at
the expense of economic and environmental optimum.
4.2.2. National interests, congestion rents and investment coordination
Congestion rents reﬂect the price diﬀerential between two market
zones when the transmission capacity connecting the zones is scarce.
The level of the rent gives the signal that further capacity investment is
needed, which will in turn contribute to equalisation of average elec-
tricity prices in the neighbouring markets. The economic principle, also
basis for the Regulation (EC) No 714/2009 (Art 16(6)), states conges-
tion rents should primarily be utilised to expand cross-border inter-
connection capacities. However, it is usual that part or all of the rent is
allocated to serve other policies, mostly, at maintaining domestic tariﬀs
low for the grid users.
Between 2011 and 2015, only Finland, Poland Latvia and Lithuania
used in average more than 90% of their congestion rents to increase
their interconnection capacities or saved it for future investment, while
Denmark and Germany used more than half of their congestion rent to
lower domestic tariﬀs (European Commission, 2017). Another reason
for the sub-optimal allocation of congestion rents is the expected wel-
fare loss resulting from increased interconnection capacities between
two market zones showing substantial price diﬀerential. In this case, an
increase of the average spot price will occur in the country with the
initial lowest average price and inversely.
Both examples show how national interests can aﬀect trans-national
network projects and depart from the economic optimum. Several
works using game theory represent national interest preferences in
transmission infrastructure development scenarios. They all demon-
strate the non-cooperative situations result in signiﬁcant welfare losses
as compared to system-optimal investment and argue for increased
centralisation (Buijs et al., 2010; Huppmann and Egerer, 2015;
Tangerås, 2012; Daxhelet and Smeers, 2007). Empirical evidence on
how national preferences may drive national TSOs’ actions, sometimes
at the expense of neighbouring countries, have notably been developed
by Tangerås (2012). At the regional level, the diﬀerent treatment of
congestion revenue and the interference of other targets with trans-
mission grid development contradict with a clear, economic-based and
harmonised signal for future common trans-national networks.
4.2.3. Cost allocation methods for connection and uneven investment risks
Finally, the rules for the distribution of OW connection costs be-
tween the TSO and the OW developer is a critical factor for OW in-
tegration, as the OW connection costs are signiﬁcantly higher than for
other renewable energies due to their resource-dependency
(Weißensteiner et al., 2011). The cost distribution regimes are com-
monly described as super shallow; shallow or deep connection
(González and Lacal-Arántegui, 2016). In a super-shallow approach, the
TSO bears the entire cost to build the submarine cable until the point of
connection at the oﬀshore substation. The shallow approach means the
OW developer bears the grid cost associated to building the new line,
whereas the deep approach refers to the situation where the OW de-
veloper bears all the network costs including the construction of the
line and the potential reinforcement of onshore networks. Both ap-
proaches give a locational signal in linking the generator's connection
cost to the physical expansion cost of the network, thereby driving cost
eﬃciency on a system perspective, but also creating signiﬁcant system
access diﬃculties for resource-dependent power plants such as OWFs
(Swider et al., 2008).
In the Baltic Sea countries, all three approaches are applied. The
three Baltic countries and Sweden use a deep connection approach to
connect their OWF. A shallow cost distribution approach is used in
Finland, Poland and in near-shore and open door projects in Denmark.
A super shallow approach is used in Denmark in recent far-from-shore
projects such as Kriegers Flak Combined Grid Solution (Baltic Sea) and
Horns Rev 3 (North Sea). Also the new German legal framework for the
tendering of oﬀshore wind capacity in the EEZ applies super shallow
approach.
In MOG, the connection rules become more critical, both in relation
to the signal that is sent to market and regulated actors (level of ﬁ-
nancial risk) and regarding the homogeneity of this signal on the same
infrastructure. The situation where diﬀerent approaches coexist creates
a complex and heterogeneous environment for joint investments. It
conducts to an uneven level playing ﬁeld among the TSOs, which are
expected to coordinate their eﬀorts, and generates further distortions
among market actors with similar impacts as in the case of diverse grid
tariﬀs.
The entanglement of national interests on top of this investment
landscape ultimately adds another layer of diﬃculty in the develop-
ment of MOG. Despite the recent eﬀorts towards more converged tar-
iﬀs, for example in the context of Clean Energy Package (European
Commission, 2016b), it is unlikely that the national legal and reg-
ulatory regimes would become fully harmonised in the near future
(Vedder et al., 2016). Thereby other solutions to enable MOG devel-
opment should be studied.
The discussion on cost allocation more generally opens the debate
on how to eﬃciently share the infrastructure burden among the TSOs.
The economics viewpoint advocates that investment should be pro-
portionate to the eﬀective beneﬁts expected from the infrastructure. A
cost (or beneﬁt)-reﬂectiveness criteria is however uneasy to capture
(Reneses et al., 2013). In that respect, the cross-border cost-beneﬁt al-
location (CBCA) methodology developed by the ENTSO-E under the
Regulation (EU) No 347/2013 (Art. 11) to apportion costs in projects of
common interest consists of a possible line of approach in a MOG grid
context since it captures multilateral investment constraints and ac-
counts for externalities. Nevertheless, a simple harmonisation and
generalization of CBCA methodologies such as advocated in (Bhagwat
et al., 2017) seems not to be suﬃcient to fully address the funding
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constraint associated with MOG, unless a strong legal framework and
appropriate cooperation structures are implemented (Tscherning,
2011).
4.3. Towards more centralised coordination?
Past research demonstrates a high level of cooperation is needed
between TSOs to reach eﬃcient regional network development, and
argue for the implementation of new frameworks for the planning,
development and cross-border cost allocation (Buijs et al., 2010;
Huppmann and Egerer, 2015; Tangerås, 2012; Daxhelet and Smeers,
2007).
Some propositions have earlier been made regarding possible new
actors to be responsible for the projects with multi-national scope and
inside the European legal regime. A regional independent system op-
erator (Konstantelos, Moreno et al., 2017) and cooperation of national
TSOs established by an international treaty (Müller, 2015) have been
suggested to organise the development and operation of a meshed grid
in a more eﬃcient way. NSCOGI (2012a) considered the option of
implementing a supra-national TSO in the North Sea but rejected it
because it was not considered credible due to its impact on Member
States’ sovereignty.
Nevertheless, past research has defended the concept of a regional
TSO in Europe to overcome the problem of diverging national interests
and facilitate coordination. Moselle (2008) suggests the establishment
of a new regional TSO with evolving responsibilities; starting with the
coordination of short-term regional operation and extending gradually
its responsibilities to investment planning. In Kapﬀ and Pelkmans
(2010), a centralised European TSO organisation entrusted with a
competence to make binding European network and investment plans
(in opposition to the current non-binding ten-year network develop-
ment plan) and monitored by a strong, European regulatory body have
been proposed. Kapﬀ and Pelkmans (2010) also argue for the in-
troduction of a compensation mechanism fed by the congestion rents
that would address the investment challenge in trans-national projects.
Some stand-alone initiatives also step in a similar direction. The Nordic
TSOs have in the past used congestion income to fund prioritised in-
vestments in the Nordic grid (NORDREG, 2007), but such decisions
remain anecdotal. At the EU level, it remains to be seen what aﬀect the
rules revised in the context Clean Energy Package will have. Still, full
coordination in large, integrated oﬀshore grid projects requires Member
States to renounce part of their sovereignty, which can also become a
wider trend when creating a functioning internal energy market and the
EU Energy Union (Heﬀron and Cameron, 2016).
5. A supra-national oﬀshore TSO as a possible solution to enhance
meshed oﬀshore grid development
Under the current legal frameworks in the BSR, there could be
several operators and developers of the diﬀerent parts in MOG.
Depending on the national legislation, these operators can be TSOs,
national oﬀshore TSOs, and wind power operators with responsibility
for the connection cables. The TSOs usually function within one
country, thus there would be several TSOs involved in a MOG project.
As discussed above, recent research shows that more coordination is
needed to optimise regional grid development and engagement in hy-
brid projects. In what follows, we discuss to what extent a separate
supra-national oﬀshore TSO could facilitate the implementation of
MOG.
5.1. Coordination through international or EU law?
In the earlier studies, the enhanced coordination through a
European level binding network and investment plans and supervision
have been discussed (Kapﬀ and Pelkmans, 2010). However, the concept
of supra-national TSO established under the EU law has not, in our
understanding, been researched earlier.
A lot of attention has been paid to study the applicability of deﬁ-
nitions under the EU electricity market law and the rising barriers. An
important part of the identiﬁed legal barriers relate to the EU level
legislation, speciﬁc rules and deﬁnitions, part of which has been given
in the form of Regulations directly applicable in the Member States.
Despite the fact that many of the challenges relate to the EU level re-
gime, the studies have not generally suggested amendments to the ap-
plicable substantive EU legislation. On contrary, an international treaty
and exemptions from EU law have been suggested (Woolley, 2013;
Müller, 2015, 2017).
We argue that it is worth to research also the EU level alternatives to
ﬁnd clear and transparent solutions to the current challenges because of
the following reasons:
• In practice, the EU law regulates also the oﬀshore interconnectors,
inside the EU internal market, even with the freedoms guaranteed
under the UNCLOS.
• Many of the current deﬁnitional challenges originate from the EU
law. A wide interpretation of the current deﬁnitions of the EU law
may be used to some extent but also creates legal uncertainties
(Nieuwenhout, 2018).
• The EU level regime could possibly help to overcome the challenges
originating from the prioritising of national interests.
• The EU legislation could also guarantee that the EU institutions, like
ACER, could be involved in the cases national regulatory authorities
cannot reach consensus in the needed regulatory decisions. If a re-
gional regime is established by a treaty, the EU institutions do not
necessarily have competence.
In what follows, we discuss further the idea of one single operator in
an MOG, namely a supra-national oﬀshore TSO that refers here to an
unbundled actor established in accordance with the EU law applicable
in all Member States in the BSR.
5.2. Deﬁnition of a supra-national oﬀshore TSO in legal terms
In the EU, all new TSOs should be ownership-unbundled from
generation and supply activities, and ‘each undertaking which owns a
transmission system acts as a transmission system operator’ (2009/72/
EC), Art. 9). Thus, the ownership of the transmission system and
transmission system operation go hand in hand. This is taken as a
starting point when deﬁning a supra-national TSO.
In this article, a supra-national oﬀshore TSO refers to ‘a transmission
system operator which operates an oﬀshore transmission system extending to
several Member States’ exclusive economic zones and territorial waters, and
which is responsible for the tasks of a transmission system operator’.
The speciality of the supra-national TSO would be the extension of
one TSO's operational area from one single country to the maritime
areas (EEZ and territorial waters) of several countries. It is however
notable that already under the current TSO regime, an operator of one
interconnector has been considered to function as an ‘oﬀshore TSO’
(European Commssion, 2014; Energimarknadsinspektionen, 2016), and
basically its narrow, interconnector-wide operational area extents to
two Member States’ territorial waters and EEZs. Despite this, there are
currently no oﬀshore TSOs operating a MOG, which is the ratio behind
the ﬁrst deﬁnition. To clarify the meaning of the ﬁrst deﬁnition, we
consider a meshed oﬀshore transmission system as ‘a transmission system
extending to several Member States’ exclusive economic zones and territorial
waters, and which is not operated by the national transmission system op-
erators. The oﬀshore transmission system includes the oﬀshore transmission
cables and other structures needed for the power transmission, until the
substations of oﬀshore electricity generation units’.
An oﬀshore transmission system would deviate from a traditional
transmission system so that it would connect only oﬀshore electricity
generators and host cross-border power exchanges. No consumption
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places would be connected in the oﬀshore transmission system.
However, it would not necessarily be meaningful to implement these
limitations into the deﬁnition, because in some cases it could possibly
be reasonable to connect also consumption units to the grid in the
middle of the sea (Roggenkamp et al., 2010), or to couple wind energy
generation with storage such as proposed in the Power Hub island
project.
5.3. From coordination to a single actor
If the oﬀshore infrastructure was considered as a transmission
system as its entirety, the deﬁnitional jungle of diﬀerent cables could be
avoided. The cables in the oﬀshore transmission system would clearly
be operated by one single operator, whereas the OW operators would be
responsible only for the connection until oﬀshore substations.
Compared to the current situation where several participants (TSOs,
oﬀshore wind power operators and even separate connection cable
operators could be involved), a supra-national TSO would streamline
the organisation of MOG projects.
As discussed earlier in this article, discrepancies in the national
regulation of TSOs currently lead to sub-optimal development of MOGs.
Introducing a supra-national TSO addresses the lack of harmonisation,
which can be expected to directly facilitate investments. If there were
only one operator and one applicable set of non-distance based tariﬀs
and connection cost-allocation methods in the same sea area, the cur-
rent challenges related to the market distortions aﬀecting OW location
and resulting from uneven legal and regulatory conditions would be
eliminated. The same would apply to the investment barriers attribu-
table to the diﬀerent levels of investment risks associated with national
and non-harmonised investment incentives. As such, a supra-national
oﬀshore TSO solves two critical risk factors associated with the eﬃcient
hybrid infrastructure development, namely having diﬀerent sets of
framework conditions for cost sharing and recovery.
Introducing a supra-national oﬀshore TSO would also lower the
hurdles caused by the diversity of national interests. The centralisation
of grid planning and development of an MOG as well as the uniformity
in investment and cost-allocation rules could help to further promote a
regional, and even European, perspective in network development. In
case there is one single operator for which incentives are not based on
purely national interests and which is by law enforced to take into
account regional, long-term objectives, the creation of MOG could be
more likely.
5.4. New challenges
Even though the main beneﬁt of the supra-national TSO is to fa-
cilitate the oﬀshore grid development, new challenges also arise. First
of all, the way of ﬁnancing the investment in and operation of the
supra-national TSO's infrastructure should be speciﬁed. As the oﬀshore
transmission system would mainly host cross-border exchanges, it could
receive revenues from ITC mechanism already under the current re-
gime, but the question of grid access tariﬀs is more complex. It should
be solved whether a supra-national oﬀshore TSO could collect separate
tariﬀs without disturbing the cross-border electricity trade and co-
operation with other TSOs. Despite the new deﬁnition for oﬀshore
transmission system, it would still provide ‘interconnectors’ linking
national TSOs. A new oﬀshore tariﬀ regime for the use of inter-
connectors would thus be in contradiction with the current legislation.
In the North Sea, the use of state aid in the context where (national)
transmission tariﬀs would not be adequate to cover the costs of the
oﬀshore parts of the grid has been discussed (Müller, 2017). In the case
of a supra-national TSO, the share of state aid would become large, if
the tariﬀ question was not properly solved. Thus, state aid is not con-
sidered as a suitable solution in the longer run.
The supervision of the supra-national TSO should also be properly
arranged to ensure that the TSO complies with the applicable rules,
including the economic regulation. The NRAs are currently responsible
for approving the TSOs’ tariﬀs or tariﬀ methodologies (Directive 2009/
72/EC, Art. 37). In the event a supra-national TSO would function in
the several Member States’ area, the NRAs should coordinate their
decision-making. Detailed rules for the operation and economic reg-
ulation of a supra-national TSO should practically be laid down at the
EU level, to avoid national diﬀerences in regulatory decisions. ACER
could be involved in the decision making when the NRAs cannot reach
consensus. Another, perhaps more straightforward and politically un-
realistic solution is that ACER would directly be entrusted with the
surveillance task, as suggested by Kapﬀ and Pelkmans (2010).
The guidelines for the division of responsibilities between the na-
tional and the supra-national TSOs should also be given at the EU level
to ensure that the oﬀshore TSO would actually be given opportunity to
function. Some new contractual arrangements between the costal TSOs
and a supra-national oﬀshore TSO would probably still be needed,
constituting a risk of eﬃciency loss in the short term. In the legislation,
the objectives of the oﬀshore transmission system operation, taking into
account the long-term regional welfare, should be laid down. Within
the stated safety and expediency conditions, the national legislators or
NRAs could still be allowed to refuse the functioning of a supra-national
TSO in the Member State's area, to ensure reliability and eﬃciency of
the power system.
Finally, despite the fact that grid operation matters are out of the
scope of this article, it can be noted that operational issues could also
occur. In principal, a supra-national oﬀshore TSO would be, as a TSO,
subject to the applicable network codes and guidelines such as
Commission Regulation (EU) (2017/2195) (balancing) and Commission
Regulation (EU) (2017/1485) (system operation). Requirements re-
lating to balancing activities, for example, can be challenging to ar-
range for an entity operating only an oﬀshore grid, which in addition
connects variable OW to the power system. Enhanced short-term co-
ordination with other TSOs would probably be needed.
5.5. Discussion on the supra national TSO solution
The introduction of a supra-national TSO would support MOG de-
velopment by creating a level playing ﬁeld for TSOs’ investment and by
removing market distortions among OW operators. In addition, the
emphasis of national interest over the regional ones could be dimin-
ished.
In general, strong and well-harmonised EU level legislation would
be a precondition for the eﬃcient implementation of supra-national
oﬀshore TSO. This would require new provisions clarifying which
general TSO rules are applied to the supra-national oﬀshore TSO and
which speciﬁc rules it should follow. Some of the rules could be better
to impose through directly applicable instruments to avoid national
discrepancies in implementation.
Compared to the advantages, implementing of this completely new
‘layer’ of grid to the power system can prove to be too burdensome and
complex. There may be also easier solutions, from the point of view of
both political acceptance and the legal coherence, than the introduction
of a supra-national TSO. However, the EU level solutions are worth to
be studied further to avoid the potential ﬂaws of regional “ad hoc so-
lutions” that are based on the exemptions from the current legal fra-
mework (Müller, 2017).
6. Conclusion and policy implications
Integrated grid solutions have the potential to become a building
block for oﬀshore wind exploitation in future decarbonised systems.
Currently, however, the lack of clear legal deﬁnitions for dual-purpose
infrastructure results in uncertainties regarding the applicable rules. In
addition, the diversity of national regulatory frameworks for trans-
mission grid development has negative impacts on the investment en-
vironment of both regulated TSOs and wind power developers. The
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prioritising of national interests that often prevails in energy policies
may also hamper implementation of projects with primarily regional
beneﬁts.
If the EU wishes to promote integrated and decarbonised electricity
systems across national boundaries, its policy makers need to have a
clear understanding of the diverse options enabling this ambition. In
this paper, we explore whether the introduction of a supra-national
oﬀshore TSO could help to overcome the identiﬁed legal and regulatory
barriers. While the earlier studies have focused mainly on the solutions
based on a multi-lateral treaty, this study ﬁlls the research gap related
to the European level solutions and anchors the discussion in the EU
legal regime. To clarify the potential status and tasks of a supra-national
oﬀshore TSO, the article introduces new legal deﬁnitions for a supra-
national oﬀshore TSO and for a meshed oﬀshore transmission system.
In addition, the potential beneﬁts and new challenges occurring from
the introduction of a new type of TSO are critically reviewed.
Based on this study, a supra-national oﬀshore TSO would not pro-
vide a straightforward solution to address all the current challenges
related to the meshed oﬀshore grid development. However, it could
help to overcome some of the main barriers relating to the grid in-
vestments and the lack of level playing ﬁeld for oﬀshore wind power
developers. The new challenges occurring from the introduction of a
supra-national TSO relating to its regulation and monitoring would be
substantial, though. While this article does not aim to provide a com-
prehensive analysis of the applicability of a supra-national TSO, it
opens new angles to the further research and discussion.
Along with the transition to clean energy system, the research
questions in energy law are changing. As new solutions in the energy
sector are breaking through, the legislation should be up to date and
enable the implementation of these solutions. Today, energy law covers
also these new currents in the sector. By studying and critically re-
viewing the possible solutions to overcome the current barriers for
clean energy transition, this article contributes to the contemporary
energy law research. Regarding the principles of contemporary energy
law, as deﬁned by Heﬀron et al. (2018), the study can be seen to relate
especially to the principle of the protection of the environment, human
health and combatting climate change and the principle of prudent,
rational and sustainable use of natural resources.
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